BitLocker is a full-disk encryption feature available in recent Windows versions. It is designed to protect data by providing encryption for entire volumes and it makes use of a number of different authentication methods. In this paper we present a solution, named BitCracker, to attempt the decryption, by means of a dictionary attack, of memory units encrypted by BitLocker with a user supplied password or the recovery password. To that purpose, we resort to GPU (Graphics Processing Units) that are, by now, widely used as generalpurpose coprocessors in high performance computing applications. BitLocker decryption process requires the computation of a very large number of SHA-256 hashes and also AES, so we propose a very fast solution, highly tuned for Nvidia GPU, for both of them. We analyze the performance of our CUDA implementation on several Nvidia GPUs and we carry out a comparison of our SHA-256 hash with the Hashcat password cracker tool. Finally, we present our OpenCL version, recently released as a plugin of the John The Ripper tool.
Introduction
BitLocker is a data protection feature that integrates with the Windows operating system and addresses the threats of data theft or exposure from lost, stolen, or inappropriately decommissioned computers. It offers a number of different authentication methods, like Trusted Platform Module, Smart Key, Recovery Password, user supplied password. BitLocker features a pretty complex proprietary architecture but it also leverages some well-known algorithms, like SHA-256 and AES. It is possible, and relatively easy (to the purpose, commercial tools are available [12] ) to instantly decrypt disks and volumes protected with BitLocker by using the decryption key extracted from the main memory (RAM). In addition, it is also possible to decrypt for offline analysis or instantly mount BitLocker volumes by utilizing the escrow key (BitLocker Recovery Key) extracted from a users Microsoft Account or retrieved from Active Directory.
If the decryption key can not be retrieved, the only alternative remains to unlock password-protected disks by attacking the password. The same, above mentioned, commercial tools offer this as an option but in a quite generic form (i.e., without taking into account the specific features of BitLocker). Moreover, according to some comments 1 , they may be also not fully reliable. The goal of the present paper is to describe our approach to attack BitLocker passwordprotected storage units. We carefully studied available information about BitLocker architecture and directly inspected several types of units in order to find out how to minimize the amount of work required to check a candidate password. The platforms we use for the attack are based on Nvidia GPUs and we carefully optimized the most computing intensive parts of the procedure achieving a performance that is, at least, comparable with that provided by well-know password crackers like Hashcat [7] for the evaluation of the SHA-256 digest function. However the main goal of our work is not providing an alternative to Hashcat as a general framework for dictionary attacks but to offer the first open-source high performance tool to test the security of storage units protected by BitLocker using the user password and recovery password authentication methods. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes BitLocker and in particular the decryption procedure of the so-called Volume Master Key; Section 3 describes our attack, that we name BitCracker, to BitLocker focusing on the optimizations made to improve the performance of the execution of the SHA-256 algorithm (that is the computational bottleneck of the decryption procedure); Section 4 presents the performance (as number of passwords that is possible to check per second) of BitCracker using different variants of the CUDA 2 architecture showing that there is an improvement of more than a factor 8 moving from the Kepler to the Volta architecture. Sec-tion 5 presents our OpenCL 3 implementation comparing the password rate with results in Section 4. Section 6 reports a comparison of the performance, limited to the evaluation of the SHA-256 digest, of BitCracker with respect to Hashcat. Finally Section 7 summarizes the results and provides indications for future activities.
BitLocker
BitLocker BitLocker can encrypt several types of memory units like internal hard disks or external memory devices 4 (flash memories, external hard disks, etc..) offering a number of different authentication methods, like Trusted Platform Module, Smart Key, Recovery Key, password, etc.. In this paper we focus on two different authentication modes: the user password mode, in which the user, to encrypt or decrypt a memory device, must type a password (as represented in Figure 1 ) and the recovery password mode, that is a 48-digit key generated by BitLocker (regardless of the authentication method chosen by the user) when encrypting a memory device 5 . By means of the recovery password the user can access an encrypted device in the event that she/he can't unlock the device normally.
During the encryption procedure, each sector in the volume is encrypted individually, with a part of the encryption key being derived from the sector number itself. This means that two sectors containing identical unencrypted data will result in different encrypted bytes being written to the disk, making it much harder to attempt to discover keys by creating and encrypting known data. BitLocker uses a complex hierarchy of keys to encrypt devices. The sectors themselves are encrypted by using a key called the Full-Volume Encryption Key (FVEK). The FVEK is not used by or accessible to users and it is, in turn, encrypted with a key called the Volume Master Key (VMK). This level of abstraction gives some unique benefits, but it makes the process a bit more difficult to understand. The FVEK is kept as a closely guarded secret because, if it were compromised, all of the sectors would need to be reencrypted. Since that would be a time-consuming operation, it is much better to avoid it. Instead, the system works with the VMK. The FVEK (encrypted with the VMK) is stored on the disk itself, as part of the volume metadata and it is never written to disk unencrypted. The VMK is also encrypted with one or more (combination of) authentication mechanisms as above mentioned; for instance, if the memory device has been encrypted with the user password method, in the volume metadata there are two encrypted VMKs: the VMK U, that is the VMK encrypted with the user password, and the VMK R, that is the VMK encrypted with the recovery password. Both FVEK and VMK are encrypted according to the Counter with CBM-MAC (CCM) mode of AES.
During the decryption procedure ( Figure 2 ) BitLocker, depending on the authentication method in use, starts to decrypt the VMK. Then, if it obtains the right value for the VMK, it decrypts in turn the FVEK and then the entire memory device.
The attack described in the present paper aims at decrypting the correct VMK key which belongs to an encrypted memory unit through a dictionary attack to the user password or to the recovery password. That is, if an attacker is able to find the password to correctly decrypt the VMK key, she/he is able to decrypt the entire memory unit with that password.
User Password VMK Decryption Procedure
To gain an insight about the workings of our attack, more information are necessary about the VMK decryption procedure (Figure 3 ) when the authentication method is a user password (see also [4] [6] and [5] 4. this loop produces an intermediate key, used with AES to encrypt the Initialization Vector (IV) (derived from a nonce); 5. XOR between encrypted IV and encrypted Message Authentication Code (MAC) to obtain the decrypted MAC; 6. XOR between encrypted IV and encrypted VMK to obtain the decrypted VMK; 7. if the MAC, calculated on the decrypted VMK, is equal to the decrypted MAC, the input password and the decrypted VMK are correct;
All the elements required by the decryption procedure (like VMK, MAC, IV, etc..) can be found inside the encrypted volume. In fact during the encryption, BitLocker stores not only encrypted data but also metadata that provide information about encryption type, keys position, OS version, file system version and so on. Thanks to [5] , [6] , [4] and [2] we understood how to get all of those information reading the BitLocker Drive Encryption (BDE) encrypted format.
After an initial header, every BDE volume contains 3 (for backup purposes) FVE (Full Volume Encryption) metadata blocks, each one composed by a block header, a metadata header and an array of metadata entries.
In Figure 4 we report an example of FVE block belonging to a memory unit encrypted with Windows 8.1, enumerating the most interesting parts: 3. The type and value of a VMK metadata entry 4. According to this value, the VMK has been encrypted using the user password authentication method 5. The salt of the VMK 6. According to this value, the type of VMK encryption is AES-CCM 7. Nonce 8. Message Authentication Code 9. Finally, the VMK Our attack executes the BitLocker decryption procedure with several performance improvements:
• The code has been optimized for NVIDIA GPUs (using the CUDA environment) (Section 3)
• We introduced a preprocessing step, before starting the main attack, to store in memory useful information for the SHA-256 based main loop (Section 3.3)
• We found a way to remove the final MAC computation and comparison (Section 3.4).
Recovery Password VMK Decryption Procedure
As above mentioned, the recovery password is a kind of passe-partout for all the authentication methods. According to [2] , the recovery password is a 48-digit number composed by eight groups of six digits; each group of six digits must be divisible by eleven and must be less than 720896. Finally, the sixth digit in each group is a checksum digit. For instance, a valid recovery password is:
236808-089419-192665-495704-618299-073414-538373-542366 The number of all possible recovery password candidates is huge, thus building the entire dictionary would require too much storage.
The algorithm used by BitLocker to encrypt a device using the recovery password is similar to the user password one with few differences during the initial SHA-256 application. Figure 5 extends the Figure 4 ; in the same FVE block (initial signature at mark number 1) there are 2 encrypted VMKs: the first one (VMK U) is encrypted with the user password (mark number 2) and the second one (VMK R) with the recovery password (mark number 3). The hardest part of the recovery password attack is to find the VMK R in the FVE blocks: each authentication method (i.e. TPM, TPM+PIN, user password, smart card, etc..) has its own FVE block format and each one stores the VMK R into a different index. Currently, we are able to find VMK R in case of devices encrypted with user password and smart card while TPM and TPM+PIN methods obfuscate the interesting part of the FVE block. BitCracker performance in case of recovery password attack is similar to the performance in case of user password; for this reason, during the rest of this paper, we report only about the performance of user password attacks.
BitCracker
Our software, named BitCracker, aims at finding (starting from a dictionary) the key of a memory unit encrypted using the password authentication method of BitLocker. To achieve that goal, BitCracker uses GPUs (Graphics Processing Units 6 ) to execute the algorithm described in Section 3.5 according In this Section we describe more in details the behaviour of our algorithm and several optimizations we introduced to enhance its performance.
SHA-256
As described in section 2.1, SHA-256 is widely used in the BitLocker decryption scheme to obtain the intermediate key from the user password, so we focused our work in the improvement of its performance on GPU. Algorithm 1 presents a brief pseudo-algorithm of SHA-256 standard (for a full description, see [3] ) that is necessary for a better understanding of the work we did. It is apparent that:
• first 16 words of W depends on the original message;
• there are two loops, the first to compute the M N message blocks and the second one to compute the 64 rounds of SHA-256;
• circular shift is widely used and aritmetic operations are only bitwise, sum, and subtraction.
Algorithm 1 SHA-256 standard algorithm 
; h = H i−1 7
13:
for t = 0 to 63 do 14: 
;
; 22: end for
CUDA optimizations
Our first implementation of the SHA-256 algorithm, was a plain C implementation quite similar to the algorithm described in Section 3.1: There are many assignments and loops with no GPU optimization. We ran our first test on a NVIDIA GPU Tesla K80 for an initial performance evaluation, reaching up to 80 passwords per second.
After that, inspired by Nayuki implementation 7 , we wrote a code without loops (only inline instructions), a lower number of operations, high throughput arithmetic instructions (see Section 4), removing all the useless aritmethics like index calculation ( w − n ) or assignments (d=c; c=b; ...). All GPU threads follow the same execution flow in a single SHA-256 execution: no shared memory is used and each thread works on its subset of passwords stored in global memory; variables used during execution are stored (as much as possible) in GPU registers and all operations are performed inline, i.e., there are no loops (except for the loop of 0x100000 SHA-256) and very few arrays index computations to limit local memory usage (more later). The type of instructions used are: 32-bit integer add, 32-bit integer shift, 32-bit bitwise AND, OR, XOR (see Section 4 for further details). We reserve special attention to the usage of GPU local memory, because it can dramatically decrease performance. Usually, if there is an array inside a kernel code declared as a local variable but accessed dynamically inside the code (i.e., array indexing is calculated at runtime) CUDA stores that array in local memory (instead of using registers) and this penalizes the performance since the local memory is actually a part of the (slow) global memory of the GPU. We reduced local memory usage as much as possible (we double-checked it by looking at the low-level PTX code) by replacing index calculations and loops.
During a second round of tests using the same NVIDIA GPU Tesla K80, we reached up to 103 passwords per second.
After that, we focused on the VMK decryption algorithm (Figure 3 ): in Section 3.3 we describe our enhancement during the second SHA-256 in each iteration of the main loop while in Section 3.4 we explain how the final comparison of the MAC can be easily removed.
First improvement: W Words
The most time-consuming part of the decryption algorithm is the loop of 0x100000 (1.048.576) SHA-256 operations, since a single hash involves many arithmetic operations. Moreover, during each iteration, the SHA-256 algorithm is applied twice to the 128 byte structure bitlockerMessage (Section 2.1) which is composed by several fields as shown in Table 1 . As mentioned above, the first 16 W words depend on the original message and the others on the first 16 words. Therefore, looking at the message in Figure 1 we were able to compute all possible W words useful for the SHA-256 of the second block of the message at each iteration in the loop, with no need to repeat many arithmetic operations during each iteration. Indeed, since for each encrypted memory unit, salt, padding and message size are always the same and hash count is a number between 0 and (0x100000-1), we can precompute all the W words, that are:
1.048.576 * 64 = 67.108.864 words * 4 byte 256M b
This kind of improvement is specific for BitLocker (precomputation can be done if there is a part of the input message that is known ahead of time) and cannot be applied to a general SHA-256 implementation.
In the beginning, we stored pre-computed W words in global memory, but we found that texture memory (due to the texture caching capabilities) could improve timings (see Section 4). For the first block, we can not precompute anything, because updateHash changes at every iteration.
Thanks to this improvement we reduced the CUDA registers pressure and usage, being able to use 64 registers for each CUDA thread and then 1024 threads for each CUDA block (about 100% occupancy). We measure a performance enhancement, reaching up to 340 passwords per second.
Second improvement: MAC comparison
During our analysis of the decrypted VMK's structure, using different Windows versions (7, 8.1 and 10) and a number of encrypted devices, we noticed several interesting facts:
1. The size of the VMK is always 44 bytes 2. First 12 bytes of decrypted VMK ( Following those considerations, we removed the MAC test doing a simple check on the initial 12 bytes of the decrypted VMK, as shown in Figure 6 .
On our GPU Tesla K80 performance reached 385 passwords per second (see Section 4 for further details).
To check the reliability of our solution, we tested BitCracker with several storage devices (both internal and USB-connected hard disks) encrypted by using passwords having between 8 and 16 characters under Windows 7 Enterprise Edition, Windows 7 Ultimate Edition and Windows 8 Pro N and Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (testing both BitLocker's compatible and non compatible modes) 8 . Although BitCracker always returned the correct output, some false positive may occur with this improved VMK check; for this reason BitCracker can be executed in 2 different modes: with (slower solution) or without (faster solution) the MAC comparison . 
Final Architecture
We implemented the final solution, shown in Algorithm 2, using CUDA and OpenCL doing an extensive performance analysis in Sections 4 and 5.
As described in Section 2.1, the main SHA-256 loop produces the intermediate key, that must be used as an AES key to encrypt the IV in order to decrypt the VMK. We have implemented our own AES version customized for GPU environment [11] , used in line 15 of Algorithm 2. In Figure 7 we represent the entire BitCracker's general procedure outside of the GPU kernels. hash = Sha256SingleExec(Sha256SingleExec(password));
3:
for i = 1 to 0x100000 do
4:
SetStartValue(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
5:
/* SHA-256 on the first message block */
6:
Compute first 32 W words, depending on hashi−i
7:
Exec first 32 rounds
8:
Compute second 32 W words
9:
Exec second 32 rounds 10:
Update hashi value
11:
/* SHA-256 on the second message block */
12:
Exec 64 rounds, reading W blocks from WTextureWords
13:
Update hashi value 14: end for
15:
Crypt IV with final hash value as key of AES 
CUDA implementation performance
In this Section we present the results of benchmarking activities of our stand-alone CUDA implementation of BitCracker with the improvements described in previous sections. We used several NVIDIA GPUs whose features are summarized in Table 3 9 . During the following tests we always set the number of CUDA blocks to the maximum number of SM allowed by the GPU architecture: further increasing this number does not improve performance. The number of CUDA threads per block is always 1024 because each thread requires no more than 64 registers (we reached the maximum occupancy).
Acronim

Kepler Architecture
We started to benchmark our final improved solution on the Kepler architecture using GPUs GTK80 (Table 4) and GFT ( The more the input grows, the better BitCracker performs. Increasing the number of blocks, each one with the same number of passwords per thread (i.e., 8), leads to a better performance since the kernel launching overhead (that is basically constant) is distributed among more blocks.
The GTK80 appears to be faster with respect to the GTF. For instance, in the 8 passwords per thread last test-case the GTK80 is able to check ∼ 70 more passwords per second than the GFT even if it has one less multiprocessor. To shed some light on this difference, we report in Table 6 a summary of instructions types and occurrences in one out of 0x100000 iterations of the SHA-256 loop.
Instruction
Throughput GTK80 Throughput GTF # Occurrence 32-bit integer add 160 160 1.121 32-bit integer shift 64 32 2.016 32-bit bitwise 160 160 1.600 Table 6 : Instructions throughput
As described in the NVIDIA developer zone 10 :
• to maximize instruction throughput, the application should minimize the use of arithmetic instructions with low throughput;
• throughput is given in number of operations per clock cycle per multiprocessor. For a warp size of 32, one instruction corresponds to 32 opera-tions, so if N is the number of operations per clock cycle, the instruction throughput is N/32 instructions per clock cycle.
Since the 32-bit integer shift is the most used instruction (due to the circular shift, see Section 3) the fact that its throughput in the GTK80 is twice than in the GFT could explain the significant difference in performance. Due to the relevance of the shift instruction, the circular shift is translated inside the PTX code in a funnel shift operation (faster than regular shift) even if this is not explicitly specified in the CUDA code. That is, an instruction like:
becomes, in PTX code:
shf.l.wrap.b32 %r8165, %r8152, %r8152, 26
We limit the number of registers for a single thread to 64. This choice makes it possible to have 1.024 threads for each block since each Stream Multiprocessor for Kepler and Maxwell GPU has 65536 32-bit registers. On the GTK80 there is no memory spilling while on the GFT we have just 24 bytes of memory spilling (handled by the L1 cache). Nevertheless, this configuration offers the best performance. The occupancy level is close to 100% provided that there are enough passwords in input (shared memory is not a limiting factor since we do not use it).
In Table 7 we report some of the metrics provided by the CUDA profiler nvprof running a synthetic test in which the number of loop iterations is limited to 65.536 to prevent the overflow of some counters that occurred in the full 0x100000 iterations execution: The number of instructions issued is greater than the number of global memory transactions, so BitCracker can be considered, somehow, instructions limited (this is not surprising since there are very few global memory load/store operations). The metrics about the texture cache confirms that the use of texture memory for W words (instead of global memory) is optimal. There is no instruction serialization inside a single warp (usually serialization is due to memory conflicts) because instruction replay overhead metrics is very close to 0. Finally, there are no local memory transactions due to our optimization work described in Section 3.2.
Maxwell Architecture
In Table 8 we present the same benchmarks of the previous Section executed on the GFTX, using CC3.5 and CC5.2 (both available on the GPU). It is worth to note that performance improves both due to the higher number of multiprocessors available in the new generation of NVIDIA cards and for the enhancements in integer instructions throughput 11 . This confirms that a well-tuned CUDA code can benefit from new features with a very limited effort.
CC
With CUDA 7.5 NVIDIA released new PTX instructions like IADD3 and LOP3, that support a range of 3-operand logic operations, such as (A&B&C), (A&B&¬C), (A&B ∨ C) and so on. According to the release notes in 12 , those instructions are fully supported on GPUs with CC 5.0 or greater, while on a Kepler architecture they are simulated; therefore we optimized BitCracker code for Maxwell cards.
In other words, the LOP3 instruction combines three operands according to a Truth Table expressed as a hexadecimal number; in Table 9 there is an example of a XOR Truth Table. See 13 for further details and examples. Table 9 : XOR Truth Table   Looking at Table 8 , Maxwell card performance increases when using 5.2 compute capability with an intensive use of the above mentioned PTX instructions for all the bitwise boolean operations involved in the SHA-256 algorithm described in 3.2.
Pascal architecture
In Table 10 , we summarize our benchmarks on GTP100. The performance improvement is close to a × 2 factor with respect to the Maxwell architecture even if the main advantage of the new architecture (i.e., the memory bandwidth that is about three times higher with respect to the Kepler architecture) has limited impact on a compute-intensive application like BitCracker. 
CC
Volta architecture
In Table 11 , we summarize our benchmarks on GTV100. The performance improvement is more than × 2 factor with respect to the Pascal architecture. 
OpenCL Implementation
In order to make BitCracker available also to non-NVIDIA GPUs, we developed an OpenCL implementation.
In Table 12 The results, reported in Table 13 , show that the OpenCL implementation is just 5% slower with respect to the CUDA original implementation on the same platform (see Table 8 ).
Work Groups
Threads 
Performance comparison
It is possible to evaluate BitCracker's performance by looking at the number of hashes per second that it computes (we recall that the check of each password requires 2.097.154 hashes, as described in Section 2.1). The number of hashes per second that BitCracker is able to perform is summarized in Table  14 15 . BitCracker's algorithm (BitCracker performs other operations beyond SHA-256) and it currently supports OpenCL only. The test aims at providing an idea about the number of SHA256 that each one of them is able to compute per second. We ran a test on the GTV100 using the following parameters:
GPU
• -m 1400 : Raw SHA-256 hash format
• -a 3 : Mask attack
• ?a?a?a?a?a?a?a?a?a : Mask to specify passwords of 8 characters
• -d : specify the GTV100 device
• -O and -w 3 as suggested by Hashcat itself to improve performance The resulting number of hashes per second is 7590 MH/s that is comparable to BitCracker's best performance on the same GPU.
John The Ripper
In order to take advantage of their system of rules for wordlist generation, our OpenCL implementation has been released as a John the Ripper (Jumbo version) [8] plugin (format name bitlocker-opencl ); the source code can be found here [9] whereas the wiki reference page is here [10] . When running bitlockeropencl format, the John The Ripper internal engine auto-tunes all the OpenCL parameters (like local and global work groups). Running a simple test like:
./john -format=bitlocker-opencl -wordlist=wordlist.txt hashFile.txt we reached up to 3150 passwords/second on the GTV100 .
The John The Ripper team developed a CPU format of our attack which can be invoked using flag "-format=bitlocker ". We reached up to 78 passwords/second on a CPU Intel(R) Xeon(R) v4, 2.20GHz.
Performance overview
In Figure 8 we plot the best performance (passwords per second) obtained testing different GPUs and software frameworks (green bars refer to the CUDA implementation whereas blue bars refer to the OpenCL implementation). 
Conclusions
We presented the first open-source implementation of a tool for efficient dictionary attacks to the BitLocker crypto system. The results show that our BitCracker may compete with a state-of-the art password cracker in terms of raw performance on the basic computational kernels whilst it is the only one providing specific shortcuts to speedup the BitLocker decryption procedure. We can conclude that, although the complex architecture of BitLocker reduces significatly the number of passwords that is possible to test in a unit of time, with respect to other crypto-systems (e.g., OpenPGP), it is still necessary to pay special attention in the choice of the user password since, with a single high-end GPU, more than a quarter-billion of passwords can be tested in a day (∼ 3000 passwords per second on a GTV100 × 86400 seconds 260 million in a day). Our implementations of SHA-256, fully customized for the CUDA-C environment, can be reused (provided that the W words optimization is turned off, since it cannot be applied to a general situation) for any procedure that requires to use that hash function (e.g., HMAC-SHA256).
Other possible improvements include the enhancement of BitCracker by adding a mask mode attack and/or a smart reading of the input dictionary (e.g. by assigning a probability to them) that are available in most widely used password crackers.
We released our CUDA and OpenCL standalone implementations on GitHub here [14] . In order to take advantage of their system of rules for wordlist generation, our OpenCL implementation has been released also as a John the Ripper (Jumbo version) [8] format. We're also planning to release BitCracker within Hashcat.
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